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I INTRODUCTION 
 
 Despite several bouts of attempted reinterpretation, the 
presidential pardon power has generally been accepted as plenary 
since the aftermath of the Civil War.  Out of heated blows thrown 
between Andrew Johnson and his Congress emerged a set of 
Supreme Court cases opining that amnesty was part of pardoning 
and suggesting that congressional attempts to control this 
presidential capacity would violate the separation of powers.  Like 
many features of U.S. Constitutional law, this treatment of the 
relationship between pardoning and amnesty and the allocation of 
both to the President remains exceptional in relation to European 
legal systems.1  Unlike a number of other divergences between 
                                                 
*
 Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights, Stanford Law 
School; Professor of Law and English, Cornell University School 
of Law.  I am grateful to participants in the Columbia Public Law 
Workshop, the St. Louis Law School Faculty Workshop and the 
Second Annual Originalism Conference at San Diego for feedback 
on earlier drafts.  This paper also benefited from the excellent 
research assistance of Romain Zamour and Jessica Spencer.   
1
 Adam Liptak’s series of articles for the N.Y. Times in 2008 on the 
subject of American exceptionalism indicated some of the areas in 
which the U.S. diverges from other parts of the world, including 
the exclusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amendment and the 
adversarial selection of expert witnesses.  Adam Liptak, U.S. Is 
Alone in Rejecting All Evidence if Police Err, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 
2008); Adam Liptak, In U.S., Expert Witnesses Are Partisan, N.Y. 
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission 2 
U.S. and continental European constitutional law, however, the 
discrepancy cannot be attributed primarily to differences between 
the civil and common law systems.   
At the time of the Founding, the common law of England 
distinguished between pardoning in individual cases—still the 
province of the King or Queen—and grants of amnesty or 
oblivion—the domain of Parliament.2  This differentiation was not 
solely derived from the dominance of legislative sovereignty 
within the eighteenth century.  Instead, it had arisen in the mid-
seventeenth century, first suggested by the ill-fated King Charles I, 
then implemented by the Interregnum Parliament, and, finally, 
fully instated at the Restoration of King Charles II.  Practice within 
the American colonies displayed greater variations, ranging from 
exalting the governor’s power of pardoning to passing acts of 
oblivion through the legislature.3  
As I have argued in Towards a Common Law Originalism, 
an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation that aims to 
be faithful to Founding Era history must not rely predominantly on 
a simplified vision of the common law derived from Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.4  Rather, such 
interpretation should examine the disparate strands of common 
laws—some emanating from the colonies and others from 
England, some more archaic and others more innovative—that 
coexisted at the time of the founding.  The resulting common law 
originalist approach would treat eighteenth-century common law 
not as providing determinate answers that fix the meaning of 
particular constitutional clauses but instead as supplying the terms 
of a debate about certain concepts.  It would assist in framing 
questions for judges or other constitutional interpreters in the 
present, but often refuse to settle them definitively through resort 
to history. 
Were Article II to be interpreted from the vantage point of 
the common laws in place when the Constitution was ratified, a 
strong argument could be made that the President’s constitutional 
power to pardon should not be construed to extend as far as 
proclaiming amnesties.  This very proposition raises the question, 
however, of whether the Constitution’s structural provisions 
partake of common law antecedents in the same manner as 
                                                                                                             
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2008).  For a discussion of the treatment of 
pardon and amnesty in French and German law, see infra notes 
146-151 and accompanying text.   
2
 See generally infra Section III. 
3
 See generally infra Section IV. 
4
 See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law 
Originalism, 51 STANFORD L. REV. 551 (2006). 
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission 3 
guarantees of rights.  Even if the rights of the new American 
citizen remained commensurate with those of the subject under the 
common law, the arrangement of government arguably altered too 
fundamentally in the shift from King to President and the change 
from parliamentary supremacy to the separation of powers to 
extrapolate common law constraints on executive power.   
Several factors, however, suggest that this argument may 
not be as persuasive as it initially appears.  To a significant extent, 
Article II’s grants of authority echo the capacities of the English 
King.5  In addition, common law interpretation was itself applied 
to assessing the scope of parliamentary power in various contexts.6  
Furthermore, the fact that the legal structures of the colonies 
experimented with diverse forms of political arrangement with 
respect to the allocation of pardon powers indicates that common 
law understandings of pardoning pertained not only to the King but 
also to other forms of executive official.  Finally, to the extent that 
the claimed constitutional power of the President exceeds the 
scope enjoyed by the King even in the seventeenth century, the 
presumption that the move towards democracy in the American 
Constitution should alter our understanding of the effect of the 
common law backdrop cuts in the opposite direction.  Indeed, 
debates about oblivion in the English context often foreshadowed 
what seem quite contemporary concerns in the United States about 
the President immunizing executive branch officials for extra-legal 
acts through the pardon power.7 
Because the common laws were not univocal at the time of 
the Founding with regard to the scope of pardoning and its political 
location or locations, a common law originalist approach would 
not insist that Congress alone should be construed as capable of 
                                                 
5
 See FEDERALIST 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the 
analogies between the constitutional powers allocated to the 
President and those exercised by the English King, but 
simultaneously enumerating the substantial limitations on the 
President’s deployment of those capacities). 
6
 For example, a late eighteenth-century treatise by Edward 
Christian, Professor of Law at Cambridge, applied a common law 
method to comprehend the scope of the power of Parliament.  
According to Christian, “The usage and custom of Parliament 
constitutes the Law of Parliament, which is part of the common 
law of the land, or part of the Lex et Consuetudo Angliae.”  AN 
EXAMINATION OF PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES; FROM WHICH IT 
APPEARS THAT AN IMPEACHMENT IS DETERMINED BY A 
DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT: WITH AN APPENDIX, IN WHICH ALL 
THE PRECEDENTS ARE COLLECTED 8 (2d ed., 1790). 
7
 See generally infra Section III.  
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granting amnesty.  Rather, an originalism attentive to the common 
laws calls into question the inevitability of the determinations 
about the pardon power reached by the Supreme Court following 
the Civil War and indicates why these should be re-examined in 
light of the indeterminacy of the historical record and the 
normative considerations supporting congressional control over 
amnesty.  As these cases themselves indicate, some of the 
entailments of amnesty—such as the restoration of those included 
to full citizenship and the return of confiscated property—involve 
powers like those of naturalization and spending that Article I 
explicitly gives to Congress.8  To the extent that an offer of 
amnesty precedes or amnesty is entailed by the cessation of 
hostilities, the Senate’s capacity to advise and consent the 
President on treaties may also be implicated.  Nor should the 
absence of an explicit congressional ability to issue amnesties in 
the Constitution be considered determinative.  Even the Supreme 
Court has affirmed that Congress may possess a power concurrent 
with the President to effect something like amnesty through the 
Commerce Clause or other provisions of Article I.9  From the 
common law originalist perspective, we should, therefore, keep our 
eye on the history of oblivion rather than allowing it to be 
overlooked or forgotten. 
 Remembering oblivion might also allow us to recover a 
different form of pardoning, one associated with transitional justice 
and the restoration of a community riven by civil strife.10  Today 
we associate pardoning with the highly salient and potentially 
corrupt instances of its application, such as the pardon of Marc 
Rich.11  This vision stands in contrast to the history of pardoning, 
replete with more routine and general mitigations of punishment as 
well as the use of pardon as a political strategy.12  Simultaneously, 
contemporary approaches to transitional justice, like the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, emphasize knowledge 
                                                 
8
 See generally infra Section II. 
9
 See infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text. 
10
 For a recent defense of the ancient version of amnesty as an 
alternative to contemporary practices of transitional justice, see 
Adriaan Lanni, Transitional Justice in Ancient Athens: A Case 
Study, 32 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 551 (2010). 
11
 See Margaret Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1195-1200 (2010) (analyzing the 
last-minute pardons of the Clinton era and how they emanated not 
only from presidential misjudgment but also from the Justice 
Department’s failure to produce sufficient pardon 
recommendations).  
12
 See id. at 1172-93. 
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as the prerequisite for personal forgiveness and political amnesty.13  
Oblivion presents an alternative model for moving forward, 
suggesting the possibility that certain kinds of conflicts would be 
better forgotten than remembered for the continued health of the 
polity.  
Four components of oblivion emerge from an examination 
of the English and American histories of the practice: its focus on 
erasing instead of rehashing; its deployment after moments of civil 
unrest, often connected with foreign conflict; its capacity to settle 
widespread property disputes and restore the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship; and its legislative character.  Although 
involving American actions abroad not at home, the most recent 
example of a missed opportunity to appeal to oblivion involved 
U.S. pressure on the Iraqi government not to grant amnesty to 
Baathists in 2006.14  Domestically, the potential for conflict 
between President and Congress over the capacity to issue amnesty 
came to the fore in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.  When 
Congress held hearings in 1974 on the advisability of passing an 
amnesty covering those currently imprisoned or effectively exiled 
for evading the draft, the question of its ability to do so in light of 
the President’s power of pardoning came to the fore and furnished 
one of the reasons that it failed to implement an oblivion.15   
Other more contemporary problems overlap at least in part 
with situations that might earlier have called for oblivion.  With the 
expansion of the rhetoric of war into areas like the war on drugs, 
and the resulting drastic sentences and sanctions imposed on 
offenders, a partial amnesty in that area could effectuate some of 
the purposes of oblivion by reintegrating a group of the 
                                                 
13
 See Frank Haldemann, Another Kind of Justice: Transitional 
Justice as Recognition, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675 (2008) 
(elaborating the dominant approach to transitional justice and 
“constru[ing] transitional justice as a moral project of 
recognition”). 
14
 Nathaniel Flick, Give Amnesty, but Not to All, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
10, 2006) (explaining that “[t]he Iraq Study Group report points to 
a lack of national reconciliation as the ‘fundamental cause of 
violence’ in Iraq” and that it “concludes that the Iraqi government 
must find ‘ways and means to reconcile with former bitter 
enemies’ and that ‘Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in 
Washington’”).   
15
 H.R. Subcomm. on Cts., Civ. Liberties, & Administration of 
Just. of the Comm. on Judi.,  H.R. 263, H.R. 674, H.R. 2167, H.R. 
3100, H.R. 5195, H.R. 10979, H.R. 10980, H.R. 13001, H. Con. 
Res. 144, and H. Con. Res. 385 Relating to Amnesty, 93d Cong. 
(Mar. 8, 11, 13, 1974). 
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disenfranchised into the political community.  Likewise, calls for a 
student loan amnesty—acknowledged to be within congressional 
power, at least insofar as legislative action does not offend the 
Takings Clause—recall the property settlement function of 
oblivions.   
 In Section Two, the Article will examine the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of pardoning in the aftermath of the Civil War.  
Within the series of cases emerging from disputes between 
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson and Congress during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, the Court both posited that amnesty and 
pardoning were synonymous and that the power to accomplish 
both rested in the hands of the President.  At the same time, the 
Court indicated that certain conventional entailments of amnesty 
could only be effectuated by Congress, suggesting the problems 
with its own assertion of the identity of pardoning and amnesty.  In 
order to uncover the nature of the difference between the two, 
Section Three turns to the early modern English equivalent of 
amnesty—oblivion.  Arriving in England from Scotland and 
international law, oblivion took hold in the seventeenth century 
and became a significant parliamentary practice.  Section Four then 
demonstrates the existence of colonial versions of oblivion—
emerging almost simultaneous with the English forms—and 
examines their legislative implementation and persistence through 
the period of the American Revolution and the relations between 
the states and the Continental Congress.  Given the significant 
Founding Era tradition of legislative oblivion even in states where 
pardoning was a gubernatorial power, a strong argument can be 
made from a common law originalist perspective for a 
congressional ability to issue amnesty or oblivion.  The final 
Section evaluates the pragmatic considerations that might be taken 
into account by the constitutional decision-makers—whether 
Court, Congress, or President—assessing the prospects for issuing 
legislative amnesties and presents various normative reasons for 
increasing the role of Congress in this form of pardoning. 
 
 
II FROM KLEIN TO KNOTE 
 
 While Alexander Hamilton’s remarks at the time of the 
Founding and the practice of some early presidents indicated that 
at least advocates of a strong executive believed the President 
could issue amnesties, the scope of the President’s pardon power 
was most firmly established by a set of cases arising after the Civil 
War.  On December 8, 1863, hoping to provide an incentive to 
hasten the end of hostilities, President Lincoln issued a 
proclamation offering pardon and amnesty to any members of the 
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission 7 
Confederacy who would put down their arms and take an oath of 
loyalty.16  Consistent in espousing broad executive authority, 
Lincoln insisted on the same day in his annual address to Congress 
that “the Constitution authorizes the Executive to grant or withhold 
pardon at his own absolute discretion” and that “he has clear 
constitutional power to withhold [pardon and restoration of 
forfeited rights] altogether or grant [them] upon the terms which he 
shall deem wisest for the public interest.”17   
Although Lincoln had similarly maintained his ability to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus without the assistance of 
Congress, the circumstances underlying his proclamation of 
amnesty differed significantly.  In July of 1862, Congress had 
passed a statute authorizing the President “to extend to persons 
who may have participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or 
part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such 
time and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the 
public welfare.”18  This law itself was fully within Lincoln’s own 
cognizance when he issued the proclamation of pardon.  Despite 
the subsequent affirmation of his own exclusive power, Lincoln’s 
actual proclamation cited not only the President’s constitutional 
capacity “to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the 
united States, except in cases of impeachment,” but also the fact 
that “laws have been enacted by Congress . . . declaring that the 
President was thereby authorized at any time thereafter by 
proclamation to extend to persons who may have participated in 
the existing rebellion, in any State or part thereof, pardon and 
amnesty . . . .”19  Notwithstanding Lincoln’s efforts to assert 
independent authority for his actions, Congress and the President 
were operating in harmony in this instance. 
 But discord soon arose.  With growing recognition of the 
substantial financial toll that the Civil War had exacted from the 
nation and the ascendance of a spirit of retribution rather than 
reconciliation, members of Congress became increasingly resistant 
                                                 
16
 For an excellent and detailed discussion of the history of this 
period, from which the general statements about the relation 
between Presidents Lincoln and Johnson and Congress are derived, 
see generally Jonathan Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln 
and Johnson (UNC Press, 1953). 
17
 Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1963, 
in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES: ABRAHAM LINCOLN 407-
09 (Gore Vidal ed., 1992). 
18
 13 Stat. at Large, 737. 
19
 Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconciliation, 
Dec. 8, 1863, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES, supra note 
17, at 411-412. 
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to offers of amnesty, offers that often entailed restoration of the 
forfeited property of former members of the Confederacy.  As a 
result, after the end of the war, and after Andrew Johnson had 
replaced the assassinated Lincoln in office, Congress repealed its 
authorization of presidential pardon and amnesty on January 21, 
1867.  Adopting Lincoln’s rhetoric and endowing it with even 
more ferocity of purpose, Johnson continued to maintain his 
exclusive capacity to decide on and implement amnesty in the face 
of this Congressional disapproval.  A series of judicial decisions on 
the scope of the President’s pardon power ensued.  Almost 
uniformly, these affirmed an extremely expansive view of the 
President’s ability under Article II “to Grant Reprieves and 
Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in cases of 
Impeachment.”20  More broadly, the Reconstruction cases, from 
the 1865 decision in Ex parte Garland forwards, reinforced the 
notion that the consequences of pardoning were vast, including not 
only “restoring all civil rights” and “making [the one pardoned] a 
new man,” but even “blot[ting] out of existence the guilt, so that, 
in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never 
committed the offence.”21  The broad language eloquently 
employed in these opinions has furnished the basis for subsequent 
understanding of the source and consequences of pardoning. 
 In Garland itself, Justice Field had already affirmed that 
the pardoning “power of the President is not subject to legislative 
control.  Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon nor 
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.  The benign 
prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any 
legislative restrictions.”22  Deploying the language of royal 
sovereignty in his invocation of the prerogative of mercy, Field 
simultaneously suggested that the President’s and the King’s 
capacities might be commensurate and commensurately expansive.  
It was not until the case of United States v. Klein, however, 
resolved in 1871, that the Court was asked to confront the 
consequences of Congress’s withdrawal of legislative permission 
for presidential pardons.  In Klein, Chief Justice Samuel Chase 
used similarly expansive rhetoric in concluding that Congress’s 
attempts to limit presidential amnesties were constitutionally 
ineffectual and that Congress could not strip the Court of Claims 
and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over cases involving the 
abandoned or captured property of presidentially pardoned 
individuals.  Notwithstanding the determination in Klein, however, 
only six years later, in an opinion in United States v. Knote again 
                                                 
20
 U.S. Const., art. 2. 
21
 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380-81 (1866).  
22
 Id. at 380. 
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penned by Justice Field, the Court held that, once assets had been 
received into the treasury, even a presidential pardon could not 
restore them to the individual in question absent congressional 
approval.   
 The relationship between Klein and Knote has been the 
subject of some debate.  One scholar has recently contended that 
looking from Klein to Knote and beyond fits within a general 
pattern by which the Supreme Court moves from affirming the 
exclusivity of the capacity of one branch in a particular area to the 
concurrent powers of several branches in that domain.23  Another 
has seen the discrepancy between the outcomes as simply tracking 
the two different statutes under which the respective individuals’ 
property had been confiscated.24  Both arguments provide insight 
into the connection between the decisions, yet both in a sense 
overestimate the discrepancy between them.  Close examination of 
Klein reveals not only its strong statements about the separation of 
powers, both between Congress and the judiciary and Congress 
and the President, but also its almost excessive reliance on 
Congress’s intent, particularly its intent in passing the initial statute 
providing for the confiscation of property.  From these passages 
we can conclude that, had Congress’s intent been different—as it 
was in the statute considered in Knote—Klein might not have been 
permitted to recover his property, regardless of his jurisdictional 
capacity to bring a claim.  This circumstance is significant because 
it suggests a sense even at the apex of assertions of the presidential 
pardon power that certain entailments of amnesty or oblivion, like 
the restoration of property that had already vested in the 
government or a private party, might still lie outside scope of the 
President’s authority.   
 The core of Klein entails invalidation of a jurisdictional 
proviso on an appropriations bill that, in substance, rendered 
“acceptance of a pardon, without disclaimer, [] conclusive 
evidence of the acts pardoned, but [] null and void as evidence of 
the rights conferred by it, both in the Court of Claims and in [the 
Supreme Court].”25  According to the majority opinion, this section 
                                                 
23
 Mark D. Rosen, “From Exclusivity to Concurrence,” 94 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1051 (2010). 
24
 Jeffrey Crouch, The Presidential Pardon Power 46-48 (Kansas 
UP, 2009).  
25
 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 144 (1871).  For an 
excellent recent account of the jurisdictional issues at stake in 
Klein and their potential relevance today, see Amanda Tyler, “The 
Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to Shape the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,” in Federal Courts Stories, 
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of the law fell outside the scope of Congress’s ability under Article 
III to carve exceptions in the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction.26  Although Congress possessed the authority to 
“den[y] the right of appeal in a particular class of cases,” in this 
instance it went as far as to impermissibly prescribe “a rule of 
decision, in causes pending.”27  Furthermore, as Chief Justice 
Chase added, “[t]he rule prescribed is also liable to just exception 
as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the 
constitutional power of the Executive.”28 
 Around these lucid and seemingly definitive statements 
about the limitations on Congress’s ability to restrict the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction and infringe on the President’s 
pardon power lurk a number of other rather obscure comments 
about Congress’s intent in passing the proviso.  At the beginning of 
the discussion of the relevant act, the opinion notes that, “Soon 
afterwards the provision in question was introduced . . . and 
became a part of the act, with perhaps little consideration in either 
House of Congress.”29  Even more strangely, following discussion 
of the constitutional infirmities of the law with respect to the 
separation of powers, the majority concludes on the note of 
statutory interpretation: 
We repeat that it is impossible to believe that this 
provision was not inserted in the appropriation bill 
through inadvertence; and that we shall not best 
fulfil the deliberate will of the legislature by 
DENYING the motion to dismiss and AFFIRMING 
the judgment of the Court of Claims; which is 
ACCORDINGLY DONE.30 
Entirely implausibly, the opinion thus claimed to be following the 
true will of Congress—rather than its expressed purpose—instead 
of simply invalidating the jurisdictional provision on constitutional 
grounds. 
 Interpretation of another statute, however, furnishes a 
crucial pre-condition for even reaching the jurisdictional question.  
Indeed, the two dissenters, Justices Miller and Bradley, disagreed 
                                                                                                             
Vicki Jackson and Judith Resnik eds. (NY: Foundation Press, 
2010). 
26
 Id. at 146.  See U.S. Const. art. III, sect. 2 (“In all the other cases 
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and 
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.”). 
27
 Id. at 145-146. 
28
 Id. at 147. 
29
 Id. at 143 (italics added). 
30
 Id. at 148. 
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with the majority not on the constitutionality of the proviso but 
rather on the underlying issue of whether the Abandoned and 
Captured Property Act of 1863 left any remaining interest in the 
original property owner.  According to Justice Miller, “I must 
construe this act, as all others should be construed, by seeking the 
intention of its framers, and the intention to restore the proceeds of 
such property to the loyal citizen, and to transfer it absolutely to 
the government in the case of those who had given active support 
to the rebellion, is to me too apparent to be disregarded.”31  
Because the intent of the statute was to deprive the owner of all 
rights to the property at issue, and “the property [had] already been 
seized and sold, and the proceeds paid into the treasury, . . . the 
pardon does not and cannot restore that which has thus completely 
passed away.”32  Although the outcome of Klein would seem to 
suggest that the majority deemed otherwise, their determination 
instead rested on a different understanding of Congress’s intent, an 
understanding that itself relied on Congress’s initial act of 
authorizing presidential pardons and amnesties.   
 In explaining the effect of the 1863 Act, Chief Justice 
Chase, writing for the majority, by contrast emphasized that the 
law was passed after the earlier 1862 statute—which also effected 
confiscations—authorized the President to grant pardon and 
amnesty.33  The implication of his analysis was that the existence 
of the prior law indicated Congress’s intent to permit the President 
to restore property to pardoned individuals even under the later 
Abandoned and Captured Property Act.  The subsequent repeal of 
Congress’s authorization of pardon and amnesty under the 1862 
law in 1867 could not affect the meaning of the Abandoned and 
Captured Property Act, which had been enacted against the 
backdrop of the repealed provisions.  Hence, as the opinion 
concluded, “it is impossible to believe, while the repealed 
provision was in full force, and the faith of the legislature as well 
as the Executive was engaged to the restoration of the rights of 
property promised by the latter, that the proceeds of property of 
persons pardoned, which had been paid into the treasury, were to 
be withheld from them.”34   
 The following sentence confused matters, however, by 
relying on the effects of a presidential pardon per se rather than 
interpretation of the meaning of the Abandoned and Captured 
Property Act.  According to Chief Justice Chase, “The repeal of 
the section in no respect changes the national obligation, for it does 
                                                 
31
 Id. at 149 (Miller, J. dissenting). 
32
 Id. at 150 (Miller, J. dissenting). 
33
 Id. at 139. 
34
 Id. at 141-42. 
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not alter at all the operation of the pardon, or reduce in any degree 
the obligations of Congress under the Constitution to give full 
effect to it, if necessary, by legislation.”35  It is this statement that 
raises a potential conflict with United States v. Knote, where the 
Court would support Congress’s independent ability to decide on 
whether to dispense monies from the treasury, regardless of the 
existence of a presidential pardon or amnesty.  If Congress were, 
indeed, obligated to give full effect to any pardon or amnesty, it 
might be forced to pass legislation restoring property to pardoned 
individuals.  According to Knote, however, it is subject to no such 
requirement. 
 The property at issue in Knote had been confiscated not 
under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act but instead under 
the 1862 confiscation act, the pardon and amnesty provisions of 
which had been repealed.  While reiterating and even 
supplementing the expansive representation of the President’s 
pardon power provided in Klein, Knote nevertheless insisted that 
the pardon does not “affect any rights which have vested in others 
directly by the execution of the judgment for the offence, or which 
have been acquired by others whilst that judgment was in force.”36  
Hence, despite the vast scope of the President’s pardon, reaching 
amnesty as well, “there is this limit to it, as there is to all his 
powers,—it cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United 
States, except expressly authorized by act of Congress.  The 
Constitution places this restriction upon the pardoning power.”37  
The congressional capacity to dispose of assets from the federal 
fisc implied in the Court’s reasoning in Klein is explicitly brought 
to the fore in Knote and forms the basis for the decision in the case.  
Unlike the 1863 Act—the legislative intent of which the Court had 
interpreted in light of the pardon and amnesty provisions already 
passed in 1862—the 1862 Act itself had been divested of the 
entailments of pardon through the later repeal and could not be 
construed to permit restoration of forfeited property the value of 
which had already been deposited in the treasury.   
 It is precisely in these cases, including Knote itself, that the 
Court expressed its judgment that pardon and amnesty were the 
same, a judgment that carries over to the present day.  It is 
precisely in these cases as well, however, that the Court’s 
reasoning suggests why the full entailments of amnesty may 
require legislative rather than simply presidential action.  As Klein 
maintained, both exalting the President’s capacity and insisting on 
the erasing effects of the pardon, “To the executive alone is 
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intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.  
Pardon includes amnesty.  It blots out the offence pardoned and 
removes all its penal consequences.”38  Citing these passages of 
Klein, Knote went even further.  As Justice Field observed:  
Some distinction has been made, or attempted to be 
made, between pardon and amnesty.  It is 
sometimes said that the latter operates as an 
extinction of the offence of which it is the object, 
causing it to be forgotten, so far as the public 
interests are concerned, whilst the former only 
operates to remove the penalties of the offence.  
This distinction is not, however, recognized in our 
law.  The Constitution does not use the word 
‘amnesty;’ and, except that the term is generally 
employed where pardon is extended to whole 
classes or communities, instead of individuals, the 
distinction between them is one rather of 
philological interest than of legal importance.  At all 
events, nothing can be gained in the consideration 
of the question before us by showing that there is 
any difference in their operation.39 
The extent of the effects of amnesty, however, and the fact that its 
entailments might, as Knote observes, require congressional action 
supports the possibility of a greater distinction that Field would 
like to acknowledge.  To understand the full meaning of the 
“philological” difference and comprehend its potential implications 
for American law we must, however, turn back to the debates of an 
earlier moment in another country. 
 
 
III OBLIVION ENTERS ENGLAND 
 
 Within early modern England, “amnesty” was addressed 
under the Latinate term of “oblivion.”  As the second edition of 
Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary glossed “amnesty,” it consisted in 
“An act of oblivion; an act by which crimes against the 
government, to a certain time, are so obliterated, that they can 
never be brought into charge.”  “Oblivion” itself he described 
somewhat symmetrically as “Amnesty: general pardon of crimes in 
a state.”40  The concept of oblivion appears to have arrived in 
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 The 1708 edition of Boyer’s Royal Dictionary likewise equated 
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England with the Stuart Kings, brought with them from Scotland, 
where an Act of Oblivion had been passed at least as early as the 
sixteenth century.  Although general pardons had proliferated in 
England before, these remained somewhat distinct from oblivion in 
context and effect.41  Whereas general pardons were, in an early 
period, often proclaimed by the King, oblivion was legislatively 
enacted.  Whereas general pardons occurred routinely on 
coronation and other occasions, oblivion was deemed necessary in 
the aftermath of rebellion or revolution.  And whereas general 
pardons forgave preceding crimes, oblivion wiped them out.  In the 
words of Bailey’s Universal Etymological Dictionary, it 
“import[ed] that all Hostilities are at an End, passed by, and to be 
buried in Oblivion.”42  As debates within the seventeenth century 
reveal, and Johnson’s subsequent description confirms, oblivion 
did, however, exist in close proximity to the general pardon.  
Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the two could be seen 
as intertwined, and the general pardon itself became more 
legislative in nature.   
 In the heat of the Reformation, the 1560 Treaty of 
Edinburgh—signed by France and England and establishing Queen 
Elizabeth’s dominion over England and Ireland—granted an 
oblivion for participation in hostilities in Scotland.  As Queen 
Elizabeth’s emissaries there informed her, the treaty provided that 
“All things done here against the laws shall be discharged, and a 
law of oblivion shall be established in this Parliament, excepting 
only such as the Estates here shall judge unworthy of this 
privilege.”43  Significantly, although the Scottish Lords agreed to 
the treaty, Mary Queen of Scots assented neither at the time nor 
subsequently.  Of necessity, therefore, passage of oblivion rested 
with the Scottish Parliament, and the task of specifying exceptions 
also devolved to “the Estates.”  Only after some importuning was 
Queen Mary willing to assent to the Act itself, although she 
ultimately allowed it to be extended to cover activities undertaken 
through September 1, 1561.  According to one account, “It was 
with some difficulty that the queen was brought to consent to this 
confirmation.  She was afraid, that it might be considered as giving 
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 For a thorough treatment of the nature of the general pardon in 
the sixteenth century, see Krista Kesselring, Mercy and Authority 
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a sanction to the treaty of Edinburgh, which she was firmly 
resolved never to ratify; but upon the lords of parliament throwing 
themselves on their knees at her feet, and urging, that it was the 
only measure which could restore the public tranquillity, she gave 
her consent.”44  Partly because of the context from which it arose, 
this sixteenth-century Scottish act of oblivion thus already assumed 
a legislative form.  
 It may not have been incidental that this oblivion was 
impelled by a treaty.  The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, frequently 
credited with inaugurating the modern regime of nation states 
enjoying territorial sovereignty, itself included a comprehensive 
oblivion.45  Nor was this provision entirely an innovation—rather, 
the concept and clauses of oblivion had been developed within 
Renaissance treaties.46  There is some evidence that the Treaty of 
Westphalia and other similar documents were influenced at least 
indirectly by Roman law, including the Roman conception of 
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Earliest Accounts to the Present Time, vol .6, at 216 (London, 
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Ages to World War I, at 404 (Randall Lesafer ed., 2004) 
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restitutio.47  In the Westphalian context, this involved the 
incorporation of a clause allowing for the restoration of previous 
rights through a “general and unlimited amnesty.”48  Athens had 
famously pioneered the device of amnesty in responding to the 
reign of the Thirty Tyrants in 403 B.C.49  Although most Roman 
memory sanctions involved punishing individuals by erasing them 
from the public record, the possibility of a more political amnesty 
that would allow for the reintegration of the polity was also raised 
on several occasions.50  These ancient antecedents may have 
infiltrated modern Europe through the terms of international peace 
treaties.    
 With the Stuart succession to the English throne—first 
through Mary’s son King James VI and I, and then via his own 
offspring, the ill-fated King Charles I—advocates for acts of 
oblivion arrived as well.  Starting with the first Bishop’s War with 
the Scots in 1639, King Charles I began to press such legislation.  
Although the Scots agreed to cease their rebellion, when the 
subject of the Act of Oblivion arose in Parliament, they resisted it, 
and instead wished “to justifie themselves, and all their former 
proceedings, and urge an act of Iustification to be recorded in 
Parliament.”51  Following resumption of hostilities, the Scots 
(joined by the English Parliament) did eventually accept—and 
even solicit—another Act of Oblivion, one effect of which was to 
prevent Charles I from even mentioning it when responding to 
subsequent charges from Parliament.52  
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 Id. at 354.  As Sanderson reported the King’s remarks in his 
history of Charles I’s reign: “As for the Scots Troubles, these 
unhappy Differences are wrapt up in perpetual silence by the Act 
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A number of subsequent assays at and failures to achieve 
Acts of Oblivion followed during the remainder of Charles I’s 
reign, leading up to and through the beginnings of the English 
Civil War.  As a rule, the King would propose such an enactment, 
and parliamentary forces would express opposition to pardoning 
those who were in league with Charles himself or were already 
under parliamentary investigation.53  The response that King 
Charles framed to one iteration of this objection summarized his 
general posture on the subject, which insisted both upon loyalty to 
his adherents and oblivion as a means of achieving a more lasting 
peace: 
[T]his he [Charles I] well knoweth, That a general Act of 
Oblivion is the best bond of Peace; and that after intestine 
troubles, the wisdom of this and other Kingdoms hath 
usually and happily in all Ages granted general Pardons, 
                                                                                                             
of Oblivion passed in Parliaments of both Kingdoms, which stays 
him from any further Reply to revive the memory of these evils.” 
Sanderson, supra note 52, at 503.  
53
 Sanderson’s account demonstrates this dynamic.  In 1644, King 
Charles explained that, “for the total removing of all Fears and 
Iealousies, his Majestie is willing to agree, that upon the 
conclusion of Peace, there shall be a general Act of Oblivion and 
free Pardon past by Act of Parliament in both his Kingdoms 
respectively.”  Id. at 857-58.  Parliament then demanded in 1646 
that certain people be excepted from the peace and from any Act of 
Oblivion.  Parliament insisted “[t]hat these persons shall expect no 
pardon.  In a word all the persons of Honour and Quality that have 
taken up Arms for the King in England or Scotland, (which 
because the Treaty took no effect is but frivolous to insert.)  And 
all such others as being processed by the Estates for Treason shall 
be condemned before the Act of Oblivion be passed,” and, 
furthermore, “[t]hat all Iudges, Officers, and Practicers of the Law, 
that have deserted the Parliament, be incapable of Office or 
Practice in the Law . . . .”  Id. at 917.  
Charles again suggested the possibility of an Act of 
Oblivion in 1647, observing that “the Army (for the rest though 
necessary, yet I suppose are not difficult to content) ought (in my 
judgment) to enjoy the liberty of their consciences, have an Act of 
Oblivion or Indempnity (which should extend to all the rest of my 
Subjects) . . . .”  Id. at 1018.  In 1648, he likewise urged “That an 
Act of Amnestie or Oblivion be passed, the very means of all 
traverses which happened in the heat of War may be utterly 
deleted.  This Demand they liked not, but with cautely and 
limitations, by the benefit whereof the Parliament might persecute 
many of the Royallists.”  Id. at 1096. 
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whereby the numerous discontentments of Persons and 
Families otherwise exposed to ruin, might not become fuel 
to new disorders, or seeds to future troubles.  His Majesty 
therefore desires, that his two Houses of Parliament would 
seriously descend into these considerations, and likewise 
tenderly look upon his condition herein, and the perpetual 
dishonour that must cleave to him, if he shall thus abandon 
so many persons of Condition and Fortune that have 
engaged themselves with and for him, out of a sense of 
duty, and propounds as a very acceptable testimony of their 
affection to him, that a general Act of Oblivion and free 
Pardon be forthwith passed by Act of Parliament.54  
Although the Interregnum Parliament would eventually, after some 
delay, take this politic advice, and pass a general pardon of its 
own, Charles’ plea, when made, fell upon deaf ears, and he never 
received the advantage of such an act.55  
The successive rejections of Charles’ offers of and requests 
for oblivion did not, however, cause him to abandon belief in the 
power of pardoning, even beyond his own death.  In his final letter 
to his already exiled son, Charles instructed the latter to follow his 
own course in preferring clemency and oblivion to revenge, both 
for religious and political reasons.56  In exalting the power of 
pardoning to his son, Charles I wrote with more effect than in his 
entreaties to Parliament. 
At the time of the Restoration, Charles II had already 
indicated several times his preference for pardoning over 
punishment.  In his 1651 Declaration to All His Loving Subjects of 
the Kingdome of England and Dominion of Wales, issued from his 
camp at Woodhouse, Charles explained that he wished “to 
evidence how fare we are from Revenge” by “Declar[ing] and 
Engag[ing] Our Selfe to give Our Consent to a full Act of Oblivion 
and Indempnity for the security of all Our Subjects of England, and 
Dominion of Wales, in their Persons, Freedomes, and Estates, for 
all things done by them relating to these Wars these seven yeeres 
past, and that they shall never be called in question by Us for any 
of them,” excepting only Cromwell, and some others “who did 
Actually sit, and Vote in the Murther of Our Royall Father.”  
Charles had, likewise, promised passage of an Act of Oblivion to 
                                                 
54
 Id. at 983-84. 
55
 The Parliamentary pardon is discussed in The Cavaliers Jubilee: 
Or, Long look’d for come at last: viz. The Generall Pardon (1652).  
The subtitle, “Long look’d for come at last,” indicates even the 
Interregnum Parliament’s reluctance to pass a general pardon and 
the resultant delay.   
56
 Sanderson, supra note 51, at 1145-46. 
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his British subjects when seeking restoration, and subsequently 
opined to Parliament that, in the absence of this promise, “neither I 
nor You had been now here.”57 
Although Charles’ Declaration of Breda had assured his 
restored subjects of his inclination towards pardoning, some delay 
intervened between this speech and Parliament’s action on the 
subject.58  Indeed, conflict broke out almost immediately during 
the parliamentary deliberations; one member had injudiciously 
claimed that those who first began the Civil War were as guilty as 
those who had ultimately executed Charles I, a statement that drew 
great resistance and would have led to punishment had the 
Parliament not been simultaneously considering mercy, pardon, 
and indemnity.59  The time that lapsed between the Declaration of 
Breda and Parliament’s passage of the Act of Oblivion was 
construed by some as indicating the King’s retraction of his 
promises; as a result, and in response to these criticisms, Charles 
renewed his pleas to Parliament in favor of the Act.60  As a 
member of the House subsequently recollected, passage of the 
oblivion ultimately occurred in haste and with a perception of 
necessity.61 
The language of the Act as well as Charles’ speech 
accompanying it suggested two central purposes—to avoid the 
possibility of continued struggle based on the revolutionaries’ 
assumption that they remained in danger, and, counterintuitively, 
to enable harsher punishment of future treasonous activity.62  In 
service of the former goal, the Act announced the King’s desire “to 
bury all seeds of future Discords and remembrance of the former, 
as well in his own Breast as in the Breasts of his subjects one 
towards the other.”63  Even the memory of the discords, not simply 
their consequences in punishment, would be eliminated; oblivion 
was not simply a velleity, but actually enforced by the Act.  
Anyone who, within three years of its passage, “presume[d] 
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maliciously to call or alleadge of or object against any other person 
or persons, any Name or Names, or other Words of Reproach, any 
way tending to revive the Memory of the late Differences, or the 
Occasions thereof,” would be forced to pay the aggrieved 
individual a fairly significant fine.64  As the controversy leading up 
to passing the Act had demonstrated, even discussing the 
revolutionary sequence of events could stir turmoil and lead to 
reputational harms that could spur continued violence.   
At the same time, however, Charles insisted that his 
character for mercy would not lead him into a permissive reign.  
The oblivion specified in the Act covered a precise time period—
from January 1, 1637 to June 4, 1660—and Charles accorded 
considerable significance to this delineation.  As he announced, 
subdividing time into that included within the purview of the 
statute, that between the time designated and that in which he 
spoke, and all future time, “all I do very willingly pardon . . . that 
are pardon’d by this Act of Indemnity, to that Time which is 
mention’d in the Bill: Nay, I will tell you, That, from that Time to 
this Day, I will not use great Severity, except in such Cases where 
the Malice is notorious, and the Public Peace exceedingly 
concern’d.  But for the Time to come, the same Discretion and 
Conscience, which dispos’d me to the Clemency I have express’ed 
(which is most agreeable to my Nature) will oblige me to all 
Rigour and Severity, how contrary soever it be to my Nature, 
towards those who shall not now acquiesce, but continue to 
manifest their Sedition and Dislike of the Government, either in 
Actions or Words.”65  The same equitable characteristics of 
discretion and conscience that led Charles to seek out an Act of 
Oblivion thus become the justification for enhancing the severity 
of punishment for the future.  
 The terms in which the Act was drafted also demonstrated 
some anxiety about the generality of its scope.  In its attempt to 
cover all contingencies, the Act of Oblivion included various 
catalogues of the circumstances it intended to comprehend.  The 
Act thus enumerated all of the categories of activities it would 
cover, and insisted that it should be read as if it resembled a 
traditional pardon for very specific offenses: the “said Free Pardon, 
Indempnity and Oblivion, shall be as good and effectual in the Law 
to every of his said subjects, Bodies corporate, and others before 
rehearsed, in, for, and against all things which be not hereafter in 
this present Act excepted and foreprized, as the same pardon, 
Indempnity, and Oblivion should have been, if all Offices, 
Contempt, Forfeitures, Causes, Matters, Suits, Quarrels, Judgments 
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Executions, penalties, and all other things, not hereafter in this 
present Act excepted and foreprized, had been particularly, 
singularly, especially and plainly named, rehearsed and specified, 
and also pardoned by proper and expresse Words and Names . . . 
.”
66
  The Act likewise provided for its own use as a defense by the 
“singular” subject in a particular court case despite its “general 
Words, Clauses, and Sentences.”67  
 The 1652 Act of General Pardon and Oblivion passed 
under Oliver Cromwell had also taken pains to explain that it 
should be considered as effective in each instance as an individual 
pardon would have been.68  It contained another provision, 
however, that suggested the linkage between oblivion and the 
restoration of property, a connection that has characterized a 
variety of subsequent amnesties and oblivions as well.  As the 
statute recited, employing as many synonyms as possible to fully 
convey its point,  
And the said Keepers of the Liberty of England by the 
Authority of this present Parliament, Granteth and freely 
giveth, Acquitteth, Pardoneth, Releaseth and Dischargeth to 
every of the persons, and to every of the said Bodies 
Corporate and others before rehearsed, and every of them, 
all Goods, Debts, Chattels, Fines, Issues, Profits, 
Amerciaments, Forfeitures, which to the said Keepers of 
the Liberty of England do or shall belong or appertain by 
reason of any Offence, Contempt, Trespass, Entry, 
Misdemeanor, Matter, Cause, Sequestration or Quarrel, 
had, suffered, done or committed by them or any of them 
before the said third day of September, and which be not 
hereafter in this Act foreprized and excepted.69 
The language of this release of confiscated goods and return of 
resources suggests the importance of the provision and the efforts 
taken to ensure it not be misconstrued.  The danger of incorrect 
interpretation was itself the target of the following clause, which 
mandated that the Act “be taken in all Courts . . . most beneficial to 
                                                 
66
 Act of Oblivion. 
67
 Id. 
68
 “This free pardon as effectual as if all Offences had been 
particularly named,” in “An Act of General Pardon and Oblivion” 
(Feb. 24, 1651/2), ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM, 
1642-1660 (1911), at 565-577.  For a discussion of Cromwell’s 
support for this measure, see ANTONIA FRASER, CROMWELL 399 
(1973). 
69
 Id. 
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission 22 
all and singular the Persons, Bodies Corporate, and others before 
rehearsed . . . without any ambiguity, question or other delay.”70   
 Notwithstanding these Acts’ elaborate injunctions to forget, 
many insisted that the oblivions themselves should be remembered 
and argued about precisely what such recollection should entail.  A 
satirical poem penned by Patrick Carey, presumably during the 
period of the Protectorate, after the dissolution of the Rump 
Parliament in 1653, took aim against the factions of the Barebones 
Parliament that appeared to have forgotten the oblivion.  Urging 
Cromwell to consider his promise of oblivion and forgiveness of 
debts as itself a debt, Carey wrote: 
 The Parliament, ’tis said, resolve 
 That, some time e’er they were dissolved, 
 They’d pardon each Delinquent, 
 And that (all past scores to forget) 
 Good store of Lethe they did get, 
 And round about that drink went. 
 
 The Country for its faith was praised; 
 No more the Great Tax should be raised, 
 Arrears should all be quitted: 
 Our everlasting Parliament 
 Would now give up its government; 
 A new mould should be fitted. 
 
 Th’Act of Oblivion’s laid aside, 
 Sects multiply, and subdivide, 
 ’Gainst which no order’s taken; 
 And for th’ new Representative, 
 Faith (for my part) I’d e’en as lieve 
 The thought on’t were forsaken. 
 
 . . . 
 
 Cromwell!  A promise is a debt, 
 Thou mad’st them say, they would forget; 
 O make them now remember! 
 If they their privileges urge: 
 Once more the house of office purge, 
 And scour out every member.71 
This was neither an isolated instance of recrimination nor a charge 
leveled only against the government of the Interregnum period.  
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Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission 23 
What it might mean to remember oblivion—and how extensive 
forgetting should be remained a live question for a number of 
years.  
More than half a century later, another writer raised the 
possibility that commemorating the date of the execution of King 
Charles I undermined the Act of Oblivion.  As he opined, “the Law 
which enjoins the Observation of this Day, is inconsistent with, 
and directly repugnant to the Act of Oblivion.”72  Pointing out the 
paradox of issuing sermons from the pulpit about culpability for 
Charles’ death while ordinary subjects were barred from 
mentioning the conflicts, the anonymous pamphleteer voiced the 
view that, “Were it not for the reviving the Memory of Things on 
this Day, to which the Clergy are obligated, . . . the greatest Part of 
the Populace, whose Mouths are shut by the Act of Oblivion, tho’ 
in vain, whilst the Priest’s is open, wou’d by this Time, after so 
many Years, have been in a great Measure, if not altogether as 
ignorant, that any such Thing had been transacted on the Stage of 
England, as they are of the Act of Oblivion.”73  Like Carey before 
him, this author advocated remembering the oblivion in order to 
forget other grievances that would re-open old wounds and spawn 
new strife. 
Parliamentary discussion of the scope of the oblivion and 
the extent to which either new legislation or action taken against 
the King’s ministers might violate the Act revealed the legislative 
conception of the statute.  Both supporters and opponents of King 
Charles II invoked the Act of Oblivion as setting a standard 
incompatible with subsequent legislative proposals.  In “A Letter 
from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the Country,” often 
attributed to Anthony Ashley Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, the 
author contended that the proposed “Act to prevent the dangers 
which may arise from persons disaffected to the government” 
implicitly contradicted the Act of Oblivion and, by “reviving of 
former miscarriages,” would “put[ a] vast [] number of the king’s 
subjects in utter despair of having their crimes ever forgotten.”74  
While the suggestion here was that Parliament and the King should 
remain cognizant of their former promises, represented by the 
legislation they passed, debates within the House of Commons 
indicated that there might be legal ramifications if, in the absence 
of a further statute passed by Parliament, the King took steps 
inconsistent with the Act of Oblivion. 
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Contention over this issue came to a head during extensive 
debates about a series of addresses to the King advocating the 
removal of the Duke of Lauderdale, one of his ministers.  At stake 
was the question of whether Charles himself could remove 
Lauderdale without violating the Act of Oblivion, a point that the 
King himself cleverly inserted into the discussion through his 
response to the first such address.  In answering the House of 
Commons, the King invoked the specter of the Act of Oblivion and 
his horror of making incursions into its effects: 
As to [Lauderdale’s words], his Majesty perceived, 
that, if they had been spoken, they must have been spoken 
before the last Act of general pardon; and his Majesty, 
being sensible how great a satisfaction and security the 
inviolable preservation of the former Act of indemnity and 
oblivion has been to all his subjects, cannot but apprehend 
the dangerous consequences of enquiring into any thing 
that has been pardoned by an Act of general pardon, lest the 
example of that might give men cause to fear their security 
under the first Act of Oblivion.75  
Strategically referring to the precedent of the oblivion, Charles 
suggested that undermining a subsequent legislative pardon would 
open the earlier law to incursions as well.  By associating the Act 
of General Pardon with the Act of Oblivion, Charles thereby asked 
the House to view the former as more akin to the latter than to the 
King’s independent use of his prerogative to pardon. 
 The reaction that this statement anticipated might have 
been that of Sir Edward Dering, who, during the subsequent 
debate, maintained the equality of Parliament’s several laws and 
insisted on the similarity of the effects of pardon and oblivion:  
There is no distinction between an Act of Grace and 
Oblivion, in West-minster-Hall, and he hopes you will 
make none here—He hears not a lawyer speak in it.  If an 
officer, or a deputy-lieutenant, be pardoned, as is said, for 
an offence, by Act of Parliament, surely no farther notice is 
taken of it.  As to that alleged ‘of the Act of Corporations, 
and the Assent and Consent in the Act of Uniformity, to be 
breaches made in the Act of Indemnity;’ they are by Act of 
Parliament, which only can void another Act.76  
Under this account, it would entail an exercise of prerogative that 
could violate Parliament’s earlier legislative statement for the King 
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to remove the Duke of Lauderdale.  Only a properly passed 
statute—not simply an address by the House—could furnish 
sufficient legal grounds for overturning the Act of Oblivion, and, 
by extrapolation, other acts of general pardon.  Another member, 
Sir Joseph Tredenham, expressed a similar sentiment, maintaining 
that, “Should the Duke of Lauderdale be banished, on this 
Address, the late Act of Pardon would be violated, or at least 
suspended.  Should it be violated, the King may justly say, he has 
gone by measures we have given him.”77  Likewise, Sir John Ernly 
remarked that, “If the Duke must answer aginst a public Act, and 
we have the benefit of a public Act, ’tis Strange.”78  Even more 
definitively, Sir Henry Ford proclaimed that he “Believes that the 
King might have answered categorically, as well as hypothetically, 
if he had pleased, to your Address. . . .  ’Tis for your sake the King 
removes [Lauderdale] not; and if not for yours, for the so many 
hundreds we represent.  He violates not the Pardon.”79 
 Not all members of the House were, however, convinced 
by the King’s answer, and some endeavored to draw lines between 
oblivion and pardon.  One compared the King’s privilege of 
pardoning with his capacity to remove individuals from office and 
distinguished between the effects of an Act of General Pardon and 
an Act of Oblivion.  As Sir Thomas Lee insisted, the House could 
continue to pursue Lauderdale without undermining the Act of 
Pardon: “That the Commons should shake the Act of Pardon, we 
are most studiously to clear.  The comparison must lie betwixt an 
oblivion, and pardon of crimes, for safety, named especially.  Will 
any man tell you, that the King, having power to pardon, by Grace, 
has not power to remove a servant, or his very Privy Council?”80  
Others supported distinguishing between the effects of an Act of 
Oblivion and a general pardon.  Colonel Birch thus advocated a 
further “Address to the King, with hearty thanks for the Act of 
Grace; but would have some difference made between that and an 
Act of Oblivion. . . .  He means fairly, would have hearty thanks 
returned the King for his gracious pardon, and would distinguish 
between an Act of Grace and Oblivion.”81  Ultimately, the House 
decided to renew their plea to the King and address him another 
time on the subject of Lauderdale.   
 These debates suggest a parliamentary conception of 
oblivion—and, in some cases, of general pardons as well.  A 
number of subsequent general pardons were legislatively passed, 
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as well as a further Act of Oblivion under William III.82  Exegesis 
of the meaning of oblivion during the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries indicated, however, that granting oblivion 
might entail a more radical forgetting of the events of the past than 
a general pardon, a forgetting that might even be incompatible with 
holidays memorializing aspects of a struggle.  This forgetting 
could only be accomplished by Parliament itself, with the consent 
of the nation as well as of the King.  Such forgetting was also 
accompanied in some instances by the restoration of forfeited 
property or immunization of the King’s ministers, aspects of 
oblivion that would augur later features of amnesty.   
 This is not to suggest though that there were no advocates 
of the King’s independent power to pardon, or that no one 
supported a royal grant of oblivion.  One treatise adopting an 
internationalist approach to the subject following a general pardon 
under King George III insisted—despite including a number of 
statutory pardons in the Appendix—that mercy was the peculiar 
province of the English King.  As the author of The History of the 
Clemency of our English Monarchs wrote, “Surely the Reader in 
the end, will be convinc’d, that Oblivion was the peculiar 
Characteristick of our Antient English Monarchs, tho’ they had to 
deal with stubborn and undutiful Children.”83  Reasoning from the 
laws of war and the law of nature as well as domestic precedent, 
the work insisted that the cessation of struggle should be 
                                                 
82
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accompanied by oblivion whether the conflict was of an 
international or domestic nature.  According to M.E., the author of 
the treatise, it is a “Maxim, that no more Blood ought to be shed in 
any War, than answers the End for which Arms were first assum’d.  
This therefore holds good in Civil as in Foreign Wars, because the 
Utility, Convenience and Justice is equal in both at least, if the 
Scale does not turn on the Side of the Subject; because I look upon 
the Blood of such an one to be more previous than that of a more 
foreign Enemy.”84  Because the King serves as the sovereign 
representative in the international arena and can agree to treaties of 
peace, he should, by extrapolation, be able to undertake oblivions 
in the domestic sphere.  Approaching the pardon power from the 
internationalist vantage point thus led the writer of this history of 
clemency to view the King’s capacity with respect to foreign 
conflicts as indicating the extent of his pardoning power arising out 
of civil struggle.   
 This analysis in a sense short-circuited the development of 
oblivions within Scottish and then English law.  Although akin to 
and perhaps ultimately derived from the terms of international 
peace treaties, domestic acts of oblivion came to assume a 
distinctly parliamentary form.  As the legislative debates about the 
appropriate means for honoring an oblivion demonstrated, the 
capacity to pass oblivions was, by the end of the seventeenth 
century, generally deemed a parliamentary power.  Oblivion itself, 
while resembling other forms of pardon in certain respects, 
possessed a distinct ability to erase the acts it covered and to 
restore the possession of confiscated or disputed property.  The 
question of how to remember an act of oblivion while forgetting 
the events it purported to erase remained, however, something of a 
puzzle.    
 
 
IV COLONIAL AND STATE OBLIVIONS 
 
 Pardoning practices diverged considerably within the 
American colonies, frequently varying with the political 
organization of the particular jurisdiction.  Whereas the royal 
affiliation of the Carolinas promoted a strong vision of the 
executive pardon, colonies like Connecticut and Rhode Island 
instead allocated pardoning to the legislature.85  Nor did the 
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structure of pardoning necessarily remain stable during the course 
of colonies’ history; the advent of royal charters or changes in 
political organization were often accompanied by alterations in the 
mechanisms for pardoning.86  Yet in the vast majority of cases, the 
charters or constitutions of the colonies indicated at least the 
formal presumption of an executive pardon.87  As often happens, 
however, the law on the books was not entirely consistent with the 
law in action.  Even some of the colonies that explicitly designated 
pardoning the prerogative of the governor, like Maryland, enacted 
oblivions legislatively beginning as early as the mid-seventeenth 
century. 
The actual practice of a number of colonies echoed that of 
England, distinguishing between pardon and oblivion and 
differentiating between the power to issue one or the other.  The 
timing of the earliest American oblivion—preceding the English 
statute of 1652 by several years—suggests that the colonies did not 
simply receive the distinction fully constituted from the English 
context.  The practice of oblivion, which came to England itself 
from the margins of its empire and from European traditions, 
developed distinct contours within the colonial setting, despite 
being shaped to some degree by the English experience.  Although 
the English entailments of oblivion find parallels within the 
colonies, the latter were, if anything, more intent on promoting the 
process of forgetting, adding corporal and shaming punishments to 
the fines that the English had prescribed for bringing up events that 
should be dismissed from memory.  As a number of historians of 
the Atlantic world have recently demonstrated, simply positing an 
English tradition received in America considerably oversimplifies 
the dynamic process of interchange not only between England and 
its colonies but also more broadly throughout the Atlantic.  A wide 
range of methods have been employed for examining Atlantic 
history, but common emphases on circulation around the outskirts 
of the ocean, drawing international comparisons, and situating 
national history within a larger Atlantic frame have emerged.88  
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These approaches carry implications for constitutional scholarship, 
which has often remained content with diagnosing the English 
origins of American principles without acknowledging the fluid 
interactions between colony and empire and the infiltration of 
some not quite Anglo-Saxon conventions.  The flourishing of 
oblivion in America during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries furnishes one example of experimentation across the 
Atlantic with a practice that was almost as new in England as in 
the colonies.   
Colonial legislatures’ ability to issue acts of oblivion 
continued through the period leading up to the American 
Revolution, and the new states deployed this capacity quite 
extensively, often at the behest of the federal government.  
Following the Revolution, the Continental Congress—capable only 
of suggesting laws to the states rather than enacting national 
policy—recommended the passage of acts of oblivion to state 
legislatures, recommendations that were followed in a number of 
jurisdictions.89  As examination of legislative journals and debates 
of both the local and federal variety indicates, the nominal place of 
pardoning within the state did not entirely dictate the form an 
oblivion would assume.  It was not until the Whiskey Rebellion of 
1794 that oblivion, in the new guise of amnesty, was offered 
unilaterally by President Washington during the congressional 
recess.  Even then, Pennsylvania’s parallel proffer was still termed 
an “act of oblivion,” although in substance it had lost its legislative 
connection.  The response to the Whiskey Rebellion hence marked 
the end of oblivion’s ascendancy.  Although Washington’s early 
interpretation of the scope of the president’s constitutional power 
to pardon has been taken by some scholars as indicating that 
Article II was intended to include amnesty, the history of oblivion 
through the post-Revolutionary period leading up to ratification 
demonstrates that it was frequently thought of as a legislative act.    
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 One of the earliest examples of a colonial oblivion occurred 
in 1650, in the aftermath of civil tumult in Maryland.90  Under the 
royal charter of 1632, Lord Baltimore enjoyed the ability “to 
Remit, Release, Pardon, and Abolish, all Crimes and Offences 
whatsoever against such Laws, whether before, or after Judgment 
passed.”91  On various occasions, the Lord Proprietor himself or 
his deputed governor accordingly granted pardons.  Some years 
after suspension of the sentence of a man who had slaughtered a 
cow that did not belong to him, Pope Alvey, the legislature 
petitioned the Governor to pardon Alvey, and the request was 
honored.92  In other instances, the Proprietor Cecil Calvert used his 
pardon power—or instructed the Governor to employ it on his 
behalf—to remit punishment in cases of excusable homicide.93  
Pardoning could thus be performed by the colony’s executive 
authorities.  Despite this circumstance, the Assembly joined 
together with the Lord Proprietor in enacting the 1650 oblivion. 
 The events giving rise to the need for oblivion had occurred 
some years earlier, in 1645 and 1646.94  Founded in 1634 by Cecil 
Calvert, the Second Lord Baltimore, Maryland was unusual among 
the colonies in having a Catholic proprietor, whose brother, 
Leonard Calvert, was serving as governor.  From nearly the 
beginning, religious and political tensions beset Maryland.  
Protestant inhabitants were chary about the Catholic leadership and 
not uninfluenced by the fiercely anti-Catholic rhetoric circulating 
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in England on the eve of the English Civil War.95  They were 
simultaneously concerned with protecting their political capacities 
in Maryland; the Assembly rejected the first set of laws sent over 
from England by Lord Baltimore partly on the grounds that they 
should be able to generate their own and proceeded to argue 
strenuously though unsuccessfully for a lower house veto on all 
laws and their right to pass legislation that would last for three 
years.96  It was against the backdrop of these religious and political 
tensions that English privateer Richard Ingle’s takeover of the 
government occurred. 
 Ingle himself had been trading in Maryland and Virginia in 
1642.  A fervent supporter of Parliament over the King, he refused 
arrest in the name of King Charles for his role in an altercation on 
board his ship; as he stated, “If you had arrested mee in the King 
and Parliaments name I would have obeyed it for soe it is now.”97  
He was later accused of treason for his statements promoting 
Parliament’s authority and disparaging the King, and, although the 
first case against him ended with the inconclusive verdict of 
“Ignoramus,” those opposing Ingle continued to pursue various 
judicial strategies against him.  In the meantime, Ingle had 
received a letter of marque under a December 1643 act of 
Parliament, which “authoriz[ed] the seizure of vessels trading to 
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ports that were hostile to the Parliament.”98  In January of 1645, 
armed with the letter of marque, Ingle returned to Maryland, 
essaying to foment a more general Protestant resistance against the 
colonial government and, ultimate, to capture Governor Calvert 
and return him to England to be tried.99  His missive to the 
Maryland Protestants seems to have been enthusiastically received, 
and it is likely that Ingle’s interventions did not only result in his 
capture of the ship “Looking Glass” and the pillaging of various 
areas in Maryland but even allowed for the establishment of a 
temporary Protestant government.100  Although sparked by the 
intervention of an outsider, Ingle’s rebellion depended for the 
destruction it wrought—resulting in the dissolution of Maryland’s 
government for some time—on the participation of a number of 
colonists themselves.   
 Ingle did not receive the welcome reception in England that 
he had anticipated; instead, the High Court of Admiralty refused to 
ratify his seizure of “Looking Glass” and another victim of his 
plundering, Thomas Cornwalyes, pursued a separate action against 
him under common law.101  Governor Calvert, who had fled to 
England during the rebellion, made plans to return to Maryland, 
and proffered a pardon to smooth the path to his 1646 return.102  
Why, then, was an Act of Oblivion still necessary in 1650?       
 It may not be possible to determine a single reason, but the 
circumstances leading up to the law render several explanations 
plausible.  First, the uprising had been accompanied by significant 
amounts of plunder and disruptions in property rights.  A 
legislative act might help to address some of the uncertainties 
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about ownership and liability arising from Ingle’s rebellion.103  The 
language of the statute, addressing contractual obligations and their 
validity, supports this interpretation of why it was necessary.  
Second, the assent of the assembly added legitimacy to the earlier 
pardon, a reconfirmation that may have been rendered particularly 
important by Leonard Calvert’s intervening death.  As a 
subsequent petition explained, the “[s]everall pardons by the 
former Governors Leo: Calvert Esq, mr Thomas Greene and . . . 
my Lord Baltemore then Proprietary of this Province” were 
“confirmed by an act of Assembly and an Act of oblivion to remitt 
all offences . . . .”104  Third, granting a general legislative oblivion 
carried with it the additional benefit of being able to explicitly 
except Ingle himself as well as some compatriots from the benefit 
of the pardon.  Finally, the oblivion could insist upon forgetting 
rather than simply forgiving.   
The language of the statute explained the joint efforts of the 
Lord Proprietary and the Assembly and, strikingly, covered first 
civil and then criminal actions.  After initially specifying that “ther 
shall bee an utter Abolition of all actions tending to recover 
damages for any faulte committed against any one in his 
Lordship’s peace by any of the party who were in Rebellion 
against his Lordship’s Government here,” the act proceeded to 
declare unenforceable all contracts made with any party in 
rebellion against the government and barred any suits to recover 
compensation for property or labor used in furtherance of the 
colony’s defense.  Only then did the law indicate that all 
inhabitants—with some designated exceptions—would “bee 
absolutely and freely pardoned of all offences whatsoever Capitall 
or other” committed during the relevant period.  Oblivion’s 
capacity to address and remove the financial obligations attendant 
upon civil crisis emerges particularly prominently from the order 
in which the statute treats contracts and crimes.  Even more 
important than indemnification from punishment appears the 
                                                 
103
 Governor Calvert had already attempted to address some of 
these property disputes, but the persistence of a suit by 
Cornwalleys against John Sturman in 1651 suggests that neither 
his actions nor the oblivion itself had entirely eliminated such 
controversies.  As Riordan notes, “Calvert had pardoned the rebels 
for their actions, but he was unwilling to let them keep their spoils.  
The rebels agreed to return any stolen goods they still had in their 
possession or to pay triple damages.  Some of the plundered estates 
may have been recovered in this fashion, but there is no way to be 
certain.”  Riordan, supra note 94, at 271. See also The Humble 
Peticon of John Sturman, 3 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 633 (1651).    
104
 Peticon of John Sturman, supra note 103. 
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission 34 
capacity of the legislature and Lord Proprietary together to wipe 
away any monetary complications produced by the rebellion.   
 The law differs in another respect from what would become 
the standard English structure of oblivion; those violating the 
proscription against remembering or speaking about the underlying 
events were subjected to corporal punishment rather than simply 
fines.  Whereas English oblivions generally provided for damages 
against those raising the specter of prior revolutionary scenes, 
Maryland mandated that: 
[F]or the better preserving of peace and unity it is allsoe 
enacted by the Authority and with the Consent aforesaide 
that all revileing speeches practices or Attempts tending to 
the disturbance of the Amity desired, and intended, and 
namely all revileing or upbraiding of other with matter of 
plunder Rebellion or any other Odious or reproachfull 
tearmes for any matter or thing pardoned by his Lordship or 
abolished by vertue of this Act bee utterly forborne and 
layd aside upon payne of imprisonment during pleasure 
Fine banishment Stocks Pillory whipping any one or more 
of these . . . .105 
The rather fulsome enumeration in this passage of means by which 
forgetting could be undermined suggests the assembly’s efforts to 
ensure that no one circumvent the spirit of its act.  Lest the litany 
itself fail to deter anyone, the prospects of indefinite detention, 
exile, and physical torment should have had the desired effect.  Not 
itself forgotten like some of its English analogues, this oblivion 
itself remained in force and was rendered part of the colony’s 
permanent laws in 1676.   
 Although oblivions were not enacted indiscriminately 
within the colonies, legislative records demonstrate a number of 
instances where civil unrest or rebellion found closure in oblivion 
or oblivions ratified the inauguration of a new form of government.  
In Maryland itself, the Proprietors were overthrown by protestants 
at the time of the Glorious Revolution in England.  When a new 
royal governor was installed, it was “[v]oted that an Act of 
oblivion be drawne up.”106  In Connecticut, where pardoning was 
given by the charter of 1662 to the general assembly,107 this body 
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determined in 1665 that “all former actings that have past by the 
former power at New Haven, so farr as they have concerned this 
Colony (whilst they stood as a distinct Colony,) though they in 
their own nature have seemed uncomfortable to us, yet they are 
hereby buryed in perpetuall oblivion, never to be called to 
account.”108  This oblivion, although tersely described, carried with 
it consequences.  When a subsequent lawsuit came before the 
general court, it “voated and by vote declared that the business that 
Mr. Brian Rosseter prosecuted against Mr. Leet in May Court, and 
in July last, and Mr. Leet’s appeale to this Court about it, is 
included in the act of oblivion and Mr. Leet by that act 
indemnified.”109  Similarly, after William Penn was installed in 
Pennsylvania, “An Act of Oblivion was read thrice and confirmed” 
in the legislature.110  This oblivion was legislatively enacted 
despite the power of pardoning that had been given to Penn by the 
charter of 1681.111 
 If oblivions were fortunately not required frequently during 
much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the situation 
altered rather drastically leading up to the American Revolution 
and in its aftermath.  An exchange in 1774 between the royal 
government in England and the representatives of North Carolina 
demonstrates a war waged in the terms of oblivion.  Recognizing 
the power of forgetting, King George III himself then offered 
oblivion to those of the colonists who would agree to put down 
arms.  Finally, the Continental Congress encouraged the states to 
pass oblivions to settle disputes arising out of the recent conflict 
and a number of legislatures responded compliantly. 
 In the period leading up to 1771, some North Carolinians 
had become increasingly disaffected with the methods of tax 
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collection implemented by the colonial government and perceived 
the local officials charged with enforcing colonial policy as 
corrupt.  Their general resistance, known as the “Regulator War,” 
culminated in the 1771 Battle of Alamance, sometimes considered 
the first moment of the American Revolution.  Following this 
event, an act of indemnity was passed, phrased in extremely 
general terms.  As the record of the assembly from December 16, 
1771 read, “[a] Bill to indemnify such persons as have acted in 
defence of Government, and for the preservation of the public 
peace of this Province during the late insurrection from vexatious 
suits and prosecutions” was “[r]ead the third time and passed.”112  
The purpose of this indemnity was to settle some of the financial 
woes and debts arising out of the Regulator War that might also 
have been addressed by an oblivion.  At the same time, discussions 
about the possibility of an act of oblivion itself commenced. 
These deliberations evinced a delicate interplay between 
Crown and colony, King George seemingly retaining complete 
authority over pardoning while encouraging the North Carolina 
legislature to actually implement an oblivion.  As American 
Secretary Hillsborough wrote to the governor of North Carolina in 
1772, giving and taking away with the same hand: 
[I] have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the King 
approves of what you propose upon that subject and has 
commanded me to signify to you his Majesty’s pleasure 
that you do recommend to the other Branches of the 
Legislature to concur with you in passing an act of pardon 
and Oblivion conformable thereto with such exceptions as 
shall be thought reasonable and proper, but you are not to 
give your assent to it without a clause being inserted therein 
suspending its execution until his Majesty’s Pleasure be 
known.113 
Although Governor Martin promptly encouraged the North 
Carolina Assembly to pass an act of oblivion, controversies 
between the two houses about who would be excepted from its 
purview plagued the law and prevented its passage.114  Again the 
following year, at Martin’s continued insistence, the Council and 
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Lower House considered on several occasions “A Bill of pardon 
and oblivion to the persons concerned in the late insurrection 
except such persons as are therein excepted,” again failing to 
approve of the text on the final reading.115 
 Within that same 1774 session, the earlier act of indemnity 
returned as a provocation for further controversy with England.  
While the oblivion remained pending, the Lord Commissioners of 
Trade and Plantations reproved the colonial legislature for the 
broad terms of its prior indemnity, insisting that the language must 
be revised lest the entire law be disallowed—the mechanism for 
abrogating colonial statutes.116  Undaunted, the legislature’s upper 
house responded to Governor Martin with at least feigned surprise, 
noting that the language of their own law was patterned after 
similar statutes: 
[W]e have taken under consideration the act of Indemnity . 
. . and finding that it is copied almost word for word from 
British Acts of Parliament upon similar occasions 
extending no benefit, protection or indemnity to His 
Majesty’s Subjects, who stood up in support of his 
Government in this Country, but such as have been 
extended to his Subjects of Great Britain, receive with 
surprise the information that the Lords Commissioners of 
Trade and Plantations, think an explanatory Act at all 
necessary.  We are persuaded however, that if that Honble 
Board would but compare the Act of Indemnity with the 
Act of Parliament after which it was modeled, they would 
not continue to think themselves under the necessity of 
laying a Law to which their observations refer, before the 
King, for his Royal disallowance.117 
If the Lords remained unimpressed with the similarity, the address 
continued with perhaps some irony, the assembly retained faith 
that the King himself would not treat his colonial subjects 
differently from his English ones and would therefore let the 
indemnity stand.118   
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 The sallies back and forth between colony and royal 
representatives over both indemnity and oblivion show the intricate 
political dynamics of penalty remission at the commencement of 
the American Revolution.  Whereas English officials worried that 
indemnification would excessively advantage the colonists, and 
perhaps not entirely those of whom England itself approved, the 
King retained an investment in the sovereign display of mercy, 
which he attempted to exercise through the offer of oblivion.  The 
actual practice of the colonial legislature, however, thwarted his 
efforts.  Because the act of oblivion had to be passed by the 
assembly, the terms of the law and its exceptions could be 
subjected to debate just as would the language of any other statute.  
Despite the King’s efforts, the colony could reject even oblivion if 
that oblivion failed to comply with its sense of the situation.  
Furthermore, the similarity between Parliamentary responses to 
civil war or rebellion in England and the North Carolina’s act of 
indemnity could furnish a weapon for the assembly to deploy 
against any claim of inconsistency or repugnancy between colonial 
legislation and the laws of England.  Although colonial acts of 
oblivion and similar laws had developed within America since 
1650, the resemblance of these laws to English practice should 
serve to justify them within the colonial context.  Precisely through 
echoing England’s approach to oblivions, the North Carolina 
assembly thereby laid claim to its political autonomy. 
 With the full onslaught of revolution, King George III’s 
efforts at offering oblivion continued,119 but it was not until the 
period of the Second Continental Congress that the dynamics of 
negotiation between a more general national authority and colonial 
or state efforts again became evident.  Like the British King with 
the colonies, the Continental Congress attempted to persuade the 
states to adopt oblivions.  The Continental Congress was more 
successful than the British King, however, at their task.  Most 
notably, at the behest of the Continental Congress, an oblivion was 
proffered not simply towards those who were fighting or had 
fought on the wrong side in the Revolution but rather to those 
involved in more local boundary disputes.  Within these 
discussions, however, a change was becoming evident, as the 
rhetoric of pardoning was increasingly conjoined with that of 
oblivion and recourse to the latter became more limited.  Indeed, at 
                                                 
119
 See “By his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, Proclamation” (May 
27, 1780) (alluding to “the gracious Offers which have been made 
to receive to his Majesty’s Peace and Protection, with Pardon and 
Oblivion for their past Offences; all those his deluded and 
infatuated Subjects, who should return to their Duty, and a due 
Obedience to the Laws”). 
Draft: Please Do Not Cite or Circulate Without Permission 39 
one point, an initial proposal recommending oblivion for those 
adhering to the British was reduced into a rather circumscribed 
pardon.  
Already in 1778, the Continental Congress encouraged 
state action—whether legislative or executive—to ensure pardons 
of those purportedly misled into joining the British forces, 
encouraging citizens themselves to forget the underlying offences.  
According to the minutes of the meeting, it was 
Resolved, That it be recommended to the legislatures of the 
several states to pass laws, or to the executive authority of 
each State, if invested with sufficient power, to issue 
proclamations, offering pardon, with such exceptions and 
under such limitations and restrictions as the several states 
shall think expedient, to such of their inhabitants or 
subjects, who have levied war against any of these states . . 
. : and it is recommended to the good and faithful citizens 
of these states to receive such returning penitents with 
compassion and mercy, and to forgive and bury in oblivion 
their past failings and transgressions.”120  
Five hundred copies of this resolution in English and two hundred 
in German—along with the reasons for it—were ordered printed 
and disseminated.   
 When a committed reported back to the Continental 
Congress in June of 1782 recommending that the states “pass acts 
of pardon and oblivion in favor of such persons and description of 
offenders, who have heretofore joined or adhered to the armies of 
the King of Great Britain, under such restrictions, provisos, 
conditions and limitations as to the Legislature of the respective 
States may seem meet and advancive of the Peace, Safety and 
Interests of these United States,”121 however, the proposal was not 
immediately accepted and the measure was instead recommitted.  
The result was considerably less expansive, simply advising state 
legislatures that disloyal citizens might be encouraged to rejoin 
American forces through a pardon and that they should therefore 
“take into consideration the propriety of offering pardon to such 
non-commissioned officers and privates who have been refugees 
from these States and are now in the Corps of the Enemy.”122 
 Oblivion was, however, more readily offered for conflicts 
between the states themselves.  Attempting to deal with the 
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ongoing dispute about the existence and delineation of Vermont 
from New York and New Hampshire, the Continental Congress 
instructed the latter states, also in 1782 to “pass acts of indemnity 
and oblivion, in favour of all such persons as have at any time 
previous to the passing such acts, acted under the authority of 
Vermont so called, in any manner whatsoever upon such persons 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the said States respectively: and 
provided always, that the said States of New York and New 
Hampshire, respectively, do pass acts confirming and establishing 
the titles of all persons whatever, to such lands as they do now 
actually occupy and possess within the limits of the district 
aforesaid . . . .”123  New York quickly followed suit, and a few 
months later its “Act for Pardoning Certain Offences Committed in 
the North-Eastern Parts of this State” was reported to the 
Continental Congress, accompanied by a law detailing the 
disposition of disputed property, entitled “An Act for Quieting the 
Minds of the Inhabitants in the North-Eastern Parts of this 
State.”124  The language of the Act specifically alluded to the fact 
that those pardoned had “implored the clemency of government, 
and humbly entreated the passing of an act of indemnity, oblivion 
and pardon.”125  Notably, however, the statute specified that no one 
could avail himself of the pardon who was accused of treason on 
account of loyalty to the British government.126  Even within this 
New York pardon, resistance to a more general oblivion that would 
cover the events of the Revolutionary War remained.   
Another example of oblivion from the period, in North 
Carolina, also concerned a controversy about the boundaries of a 
state’s territory.  The counties of Washington, Sullivan, and 
Greene essayed to set themselves up independently as the State of 
Franklin.  As North Carolina resisted this continuing effort, one of 
its strategies for reintegrating the individuals involved in the effort 
for independence was to issue and re-issue oblivions to those 
involved.  After an initial oblivion was passed in 1782, the 
question of whether to extend, amend or repeal it arose on a 
number of occasions throughout the following years, through 
1789.127  By its terms, the oblivion “restored . . . the said persons . . 
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. to all privileges of the other citizens of the State as if the said 
offences and misconduct had never existed.”128  The act differed, 
however, from many similar statutes in that it failed to suggest a 
definitive resolution of property disputes in favor of one side or 
another and instead indicated that injustice in the disposition of 
property should be rectified by resort to the courts of common 
law.129  The structure of oblivion was already changing, yet the act 
remained legislatively enacted and emphasized the renewed 
citizenship of those included in its terms.    
 While the minimalist notes from the sessions of the 
Continental Congress and the records from the various states 
indicate only general sentiments about the necessity for local acts 
of oblivion, a tract pseudonymously penned by Aedanus Burke as 
“Cassius” renders the political theory and the sense of historical 
precedents propelling this trend more perspicuous.130  Burke, a 
lawyer and immigrant from Ireland, was serving in the South 
Carolina House of Representatives as well as on the South 
Carolina Supreme Court when An Address to the Freemen of South 
Carolina was published in Philadelphia in 1783.131  In the Address, 
Burke lambasts General Rutledge for extending an offer of pardon 
and oblivion to British loyalists that would last only during the 
limited period of thirty days.132  Burke also excoriates the 
legislature for passing acts of exclusion, confiscation and 
amercement, thereby depriving disloyal South Carolinians not only 
of the capacity to serve in the assembly but even the ability to even 
vote for their legislators while simultaneously divesting them of 
property.  The only solution, he posits, would be an “act of 
amnesty or oblivion.”   
 As Burke reiterates several times, South Carolina’s method 
of responding to the Revolution represents the most extreme form 
of injustice, that of disguising revenge under the trappings of law.  
By passing acts designed to retaliate against those who had failed 
to fight alongside the revolutionaries, those in control of state 
government had made revenge look lawful.  Rather than allowing 
the war to reach a graceful end, such legislation instead tends to 
foment further dissention:  
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For if after a civil war, and one party vanquished, 
persecution was to go on; if the fury of laws and the fierce 
rage of passions prevailed, while the minds of men were 
yet fired by deadly revenge against their fallen adversaries; 
this would be worse than keeping up the war: it would be 
carrying on hostility under the shape of justice, which is the 
most oppressive, and of all other injustice, excites the 
greatest detestation, and the most violent factions and 
division.133  
Warning fellow South Carolinians about the judgment history 
would render upon them for adopting a merciless stance and 
rendering it part of the law itself, Burke likewise insists that, “To 
strike a blow of vengeance under the mask of justice, is the most to 
be execrated of all iniquity; and the historian who joins to a clear 
head, a good heart, never fails to deter posterity from such deeds 
by painting them in proper colours.”134  Lest the inherent injustice 
of their activities not be rendered evident by Burke’s own treatise, 
he advises that the patterns of history suggest the egregiousness of 
South Carolina’s approach and that it will be so perceived in 
hindsight. 
 A particular and rather Hobbes theory of the state lies 
beneath Burke’s assumption that divesting individuals of the rights 
of citizenship and property because of failure to aid the 
revolutionary cause represents revenge rather than justice.  
Although Burke also cites Pufendorf and others, he touts Hobbes’s 
special relevance because “he lived in England in the time of the 
grand rebellion, when England then was, as Carolina was lately, 
distracted by a fierce war, and were persecuting each other, as the 
parliament forces, or those of the king got the better.”135  From 
Hobbes and other thinkers, Burke derives the idea that, when the 
state fails in its obligation to protect the subject or citizen, natural 
law and the law of nations allow the latter to justifiably submit to a 
conquering force.136  As Burke claims: 
In this situation necessity, whose dominion triumphs over 
all human laws pointed out to our inhabitants, that as there 
was neither government, laws, nor army to protect them, 
they were at liberty to protect themselves, as well as they 
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could.  This is the law of Nature and of Nations: And all 
Statesmen, the best lawyers, and most eminent writers, 
agree, that when an invader over-runs a country, defeats the 
standing forces, and subverts its government, the 
inhabitants of such a country are justifiable to take the 
conqueror’s protection and obey his laws; and whether the 
government be a monarchy or republick, it makes no 
difference, as the reason of the thing is the same.137 
Because adherence to British rule was authorized by the 
circumstances, those who chose that approach could not justifiably 
be punished for their actions.  
 Instead, they retained the rights of citizenship that they had 
previously possessed, even if those rights had lain dormant during 
the period of the Revolution.  Burke expressed the desire “to shew, 
that on the restoration of the republic and law from British 
thralldom, the protection-men [i.e., those who sought protection 
under the British crown] who had been our citizens before, were as 
fully entitled to all the rights and freedom of citizenship, as those 
who were detained prisoners of war, or took refuge to the 
northward.”138  His argument for this conclusion depends on the 
precepts of natural law, the law of nations, and the domestic law of 
South Carolina.  As Burke asserts, “The laws of nations as well as 
the rights of nature therefore dictate, that when a country 
oppressed by a foreign power regains its liberty, the citizens should 
be restored to all the rights and liberties they before enjoyed.”139  
Critiquing the Exclusion Act, which prevented those who had not 
conformed to the terms of Rutledge’s offer of pardon from serving 
in the legislature or electing members, he further insists that the 
fundamental laws of South Carolina bolster these individuals’ 
rights:  
This Act of Assembly supposes with the Governor, that all 
who did not come in within the time specified by the 
proclamation, and serve six months, had forfeited their 
liberty, and that such as obeyed, were restored to lost 
freedom.  But the gentlemen of both Houses forgot, that the 
citizens of South-Carolina had to thank the Governor for 
nothing: Their rights and liberties were founded on 
something else besides parchment, or paper, or a 
proclamation; they were build on the laws of nature, and 
the fundamental laws of the State, and they were supported 
by the valour, and cemented by the blood of those brave 
men who fought, bled, and died in the cause of freedom, 
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not for the usurpation of a few, but for the liberties and 
happiness of all.140 
Governing only in favor of those who were loyal to the American 
cause would, under this account, violate the very principle of “we 
the people,” allowing a particular faction to retain its ascendancy 
rather than providing for the well-being of every American citizen.  
 Among the many problems that Burke identifies in 
Rutledge’s proclamation is the way in which it reaffirmed the 
governor’s own power by offering individual pardons that would 
have to be solicited rather than proffering a more general oblivion.  
He writes of the proclamation that it requires “what perhaps was 
more mortifying; they must humble themselves and supplicate for 
mercy as criminals, at the feet of a man who a little before was a 
fellow citizen, no more than on a footing with themselves.”141  By 
insisting on supplication for mercy, Rutledge placed himself in a 
position of absolute rather than contingent power over other South 
Carolinians and thereby rendered himself tyrannical.  
 In Burke’s concluding argument for an Act of Oblivion, the 
peace of the republic, restoration of citizenship and return of 
property loom large.  As authority for the grant of amnesty, Burke 
casts as far back as ancient history, citing episodes from Greece 
and Rome.  The pre-eminent example or precedent to which he 
turns, however, is that of the Act of Oblivion passed immediately 
on King Charles II’s restoration to the English throne.  He links the 
contemporary situation in America quite clearly to the moment of 
the Restoration in England: “[T]o make the matter still clearer, I 
shall draw a comparison between the conduct of the British nation, 
on the restoration, after the grand rebellion, and of our legislature 
on the re-establishment of our republic in 1782.”142  The paradigm 
provided by Charles II, who eschewed revenge in favor of peace, 
becomes the one to emulate.  As Burke writes,  
When the troubles were over, and Charles the Second was 
restored to the throne, he had his own injuries and the ruin 
of his friends, to avenge.  But did he avenge those injuries?  
Did he dismiss his first parliament, as we did the last 
assembly, leaving the terrors of law hanging over the 
people’s heads; and resolve to send the court of sessions 
through the country, to fill it with condemnations and 
convicts, to the disgrace and utter distress of families, and 
add to the list of widows and orphans?  He did nothing of 
all this.  The very first bill he passed was an act of amnesty, 
to settle the distractions of the nation.  Had he reasoned like 
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our politicians, he would have fallen upon confiscation, 
banishment and amercement; and under pretence of 
preventing a future rebellion, he would like us, have passed 
acts to exclude from votes or seats in the legislature, such 
as were deemed enemies to royalty.  Instead of such like 
measures, which would have only increased the nation’s 
misfortunes, he passed a general amnesty; out of which 
forty nine of the late king’s judges were excepted.  These 
had a fair and public trial, and of the whole, ten only were 
executed.  This was all the blood shed after so furious a 
civil war.143 
At the moment of the American Revolution, the very origins of 
oblivion in England with the English Revolution are recalled, and 
the justifications for the 1660 Act of Oblivion rehearsed.  Despite 
the fact that the parliamentary oblivion under King Charles II 
accompanied a restoration of monarchy rather than a new form of 
republican government, the paradigm of amnesty that it established 
could be applied in America. 
 Acts of oblivion thus proliferated in colonial America and 
were even reaffirmed by the Second Continental Congress.  As did 
many aspects of colonial common law bearing a family 
resemblance to English forms, these acts differed in certain 
respects from their analogues across the Atlantic.  Under them, 
property was not always restored to those pardoned but was instead 
disposed of in disparate ways, and harsher punishments were 
sometimes prescribed for violating their terms.  Nevertheless, and 
strikingly in the context of the explicit grants of pardoning power 
to governors and proprietors, oblivions remained legislatively 
enacted.     
 
 
V PRAGMATICS OF PARDONING 
 
 Because the common law contexts of pardoning and 
amnesty are not determinative as to the distinction between the two 
and their respective locations within the branches of government, 
normative arguments drawn from both the historical record and 
contemporary debate may assist in deciding where the powers 
should lie constitutionally.144  The strongest claims for presidential 
control over amnesty derive from a conception of amnesty as 
emergency power aptly articulated by Alexander Hamilton in 
Federalist 74 and the lack of an explicit amnesty clause in Article I 
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granting the capacity to Congress.  By contrast, the generality of 
amnesty and its ability to erase the memory of prior conduct, 
including perhaps immunizing executive branch officers from 
prosecution, suggests its suitability for legislative rather than 
executive action.  Furthermore, many of the entailments of 
amnesty—including the restoration of confiscated funds or the 
return of individuals to full citizenship—call upon congressional 
powers over spending or naturalization.   
While far from determinative in the context of U.S. 
constitutional law, the practice of several European countries, such 
as Germany and France, in constitutionally separating pardon from 
amnesty and the justifications that have been adduced for doing so 
illuminate some of the reasons for differentiating the two 
conceptually and allocating the former to an executive and the 
latter to a legislative branch.  With the French Revolution, the 
legislative assembly assumed the capacity to grant amnesty.145  
This new location of the amnesty power was hardly 
uncontroversial, however, and only on the advent of the Third 
Republic in 1871 was the legislature finally accepted as the 
appropriate branch.  Under the Constitution of 1958, Article 34 
specifies that statutes must prescribe an amnesty.146  Largely 
influenced by the French model, the German Weimar Constitution 
of 1919 similarly separated out pardoning from amnesty in its 
Article 49.147  As that provision indicated, “The President exercises 
the right of pardon [das Begnadigugnsrecht] for the Reich.  Reich 
amnesties [Reichsamnestien] require a Reich statute.”148  
The normative rationales adduced for maintaining a 
legislative amnesty in France were two-fold, relying partly on the 
discrepancy between amnesty and pardoning and partly on the 
notion that amnesty constitutes a political act that must be fully 
subscribed to by the representatives of the people.  On the first 
point, one writer claimed in 1848 that: 
Pardon [la grâce] intervenes only when justice has 
accomplished its mission, when the law is satisfied, when 
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all the interests are safe; it dispenses with punishment, but 
by the same token it confirms the sentence; it is associated 
with the judicial power so that that power’s work may be 
completed in mitigating punishments that would be too 
harsh.  Amnesty does not wait for judgment, but opposes it; 
amnesty stamps out the injunction of the law, prevents it 
from acting, suspends the function of the judge, suspends 
the execution of the laws.  How can amnesty be 
comprehended by pardon?  How can it be derived from 
pardon?149 
Whereas pardoning interacts with an established judicial process, 
amnesty thwarts the operations of that very system.  Furthermore, 
the greater participation of the public in the process of legislative 
deliberation suggests the suitability of allocating a decision on 
amnesty to a national assembly than a sole executive officer.  As 
French jurist Joseph Barthélemy wrote in L’Amnistie, “Amnesty is 
an act of high politics. . . .  Amnesty is an essentially national act, 
an act of national reconciliation; it must therefore come from the 
organ which is supposed to receive the most directly the will of the 
citizens.”150  Despite articulating this argument for a legislative 
power of amnesty, even Barthélemy advocated a collaboration 
with the executive, suggesting that the government propose and the 
assembly then grant the amnesty.  Although this recommendation 
was not adopted, a hybrid form has indeed developed, under which 
a law may delegate power to the executive to issue an amnesty.151 
 Although pardoning has been invoked surprisingly little by 
those debating the scope of executive power following the events 
of September 11, 2001, Alexander Hamilton’s defense of a plenary 
presidential power in this area resonates with much recent 
reasoning about states of emergency.  According to Hamilton, 
[T]he principal argument for reposing the power of 
pardoning in this case in the Chief Magistrate is this—In 
seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical 
moments, when a well timed offer of pardon to the 
insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the 
commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, 
it may never be possible afterwards to recall.  The dilatory 
process of convening the Legislature, or one of its 
branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the 
measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip 
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the golden opportunity.  The loss of a week, a day, an hour, 
may sometimes be fatal.152  
For Hamilton, the relative speed of President and Congress, with 
the former poised to act quickly to avert disaster while the latter 
lingers over details, supported a broad presidential pardon, and, in 
particular, something that sounded very much like amnesty.  
Responses to this rationale have been developed in recent years in 
relation to other posited emergency powers.  Many have, for 
instance, adduced the rapid passage of the USA Patriot Act as an 
example of Congress’s capacity to address emergency situations as 
promptly as the President.  Nevertheless, claims about timing and 
rapidity continue to be raised in aid of arguments for presidential 
emergency powers. 
 Additionally, supporters of presidential power over 
amnesty as well as pardon can cite to the contrast between Article 
I, which never mentions amnesty, and Article II, which explicitly 
states that the President may pardon.  Despite the absence of any 
mention of amnesty in Article I, however, the Supreme Court itself 
acknowledged that a concurrent congressional power could still 
persist.  In Brown v. Walker (1896), the Court upheld a challenged 
congressional act that secured witnesses immunity from 
prosecution, stating that it was “virtually an act of general amnesty, 
and belong[ed] to a class of legislation which is not uncommon 
either in England [] or in this country.”153  As the opinion further 
affirmed, “[a]lthough the constitution vests in the president ‘power 
to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United 
States, except in cases of impeachment,’ this power has never been 
held to take from congress the power to pass acts of general 
amnesty, and is ordinarily exercised only in cases of individuals 
after conviction . . . .”154  In the case in question, the amnesty was 
authorized as an incident to Congress’s commerce power. 
 The rhetoric of amnesty in many circumstances also 
involves restoring individuals to full citizenship.  When Congress 
considered whether to pass legislation granting amnesty to those 
who had avoided the draft during the Vietnam War, a number of 
comments referred to the expatriation of large groups of people 
and the desire to return the privileges of citizenship to them.155  
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Congress’s Article I power over naturalization would undergird its 
efforts to restore the capacities of those whose involvement in 
war—or, in the case of Vietnam, failure to become involved in 
war—might call into question their continued capacity as citizens.  
Furthermore, when the return of confiscated property is involved, 
at least when such property has already vested in the Treasury, 
Congress must pass legislation to fully implement the amnesty.  As 
Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer contended in another type of posited emergency, President 
Truman’s constitutional capacity to seize the steel mills was 
contingent on congressional action to raise revenues and ensure 
just compensation for the taking.156  One could similarly argue that 
the President’s ability to grant amnesty, when it entails a financial 
component, is dependent on Congress’s authorizing act.  Finally, to 
the extent that amnesty occurs in conjunction with the resolution of 
foreign as well as domestic conflicts and the conclusion of a peace 
treaty, the Senate’s role in confirming such agreements suggests 
that at least one branch of Congress should be involved.   
 A further pragmatic question might sway interpretation in 
favor of finding a congressional capacity to issue amnesty and 
limiting the President’s power in this area.  Given the fact that the 
English King lacked the abilities that advocates of a strong pardon 
power contend the President possesses, should we endorse an 
interpretation of the president’s capacity that would render him 
more potent than George III?   
   
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
 Remembering oblivion and its distinctions from pardoning 
furnishes new possibilities for U.S. approaches to transitional 
justice within the international arena as well as methods for 
treating civil unrest at home.  Although the speech protections of 
the First Amendment—not to mention the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause—would hardly permit a statute such as 
Maryland’s 1650 Act of Oblivion to be passed today, other aspects 
of oblivion could be resuscitated.  In particular, Congress could 
take up its capacity to enact amnesty in a broader set of 
circumstances than is currently acknowledged, and the connection 
between amnesty and the settling of property rights and restoration 
of citizenship could be reinvigorated.  More fundamentally, the 
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value in certain circumstances of a general forgetting rather than an 
individual forgiving might return to public consciousness.   
